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Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis
The solution to the problem of medical malpractice does not
lie . . . in taking away the rifhts of patients and enlarging the
rights of medical practitioners.
In recent years there has been a perceived 2 medical malpractice
"crisis." Although the underlying causes are in dispute,3 the crisis has
resulted from an increase in the number and amount of malpractice claims
and awards.4 As a consequence, malpractice insurance premiums for
health care providers have risen dramatically.5 The expense is ultimately
passed on to the public in the form of increased costs for health care as
well as for health care insurance. State legislatures, in response to
pressure from the medical community and out of concern for the quality
and cost of health care for their constituents, have developed a variety of
measures to alleviate the medical malpractice crisis, including modifica-
tion of the tort laws. Although these modifications have assumed many
forms, three basic groups can be discerned. The first group of
modifications is directed toward limiting the amount of the patient's
financial recovery. The second group alters substantive law to make
plaintiff's recovery more difficult. The third group of modifications
introduces screening panels or arbitration boards for medical malpractice
claims.
This Comment will first examine the categories of tort modifications
that have been formulated by state legislatures.7 It will next focus on the
constitutional issues raised by these modifications and then speculate on
the possible effect of these changes on tort law. Finally, the public policy
considerations that figure in solutions to the malpractice crisis will be
1. James Sheeran, 1975 Speech to the Council of State Governments, quoted in Co.;su.%1E
REPORTS, Sept. 1977, at 545.
2. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 20, 1975, at 53.
3. For a discussion of causation, see Bachman, Doctors: Move Closer taYour Patients, 11
TRIAL 25 (1975); Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 1179; Waxman, A Health Care Slide, II TRIAL 23 (1975); Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice
Legislation-A First Check-up, 50TUL. L. REv. 655(1976). Some of the possible underlying causes
suggested by these articles include patient alienation, technological improvement in health care, media-
influenced expectations of patients, and greater awareness of legal rights.
4. M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TOTHE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS 2-3 (1977).
5. Id. at 1; N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
6. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Although this paper will discuss only legislative responses to the medical malpractice crisis,
there are possible judicial responses as well. See, e.g., Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645,222 S.E.2d 783
(1976), which held that expert testimony was required to establish liability under the informed consent
doctrine and that the standard of care used to establish negligence for a medical specialist would be the
community standard. These issues have been the subject of legislation in some jurisdictions.
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discussed and additional legislative responses that may be fairer to the
victims of medical malpractice will be explained.
I. REDUCTION OF RECOVERI s
Legislatures have adopted several statutes that are aimed at reducing
the plaintiffs financial recovery. A plaintiffs recovery is most directly
influenced by the setting of a maximum amount recoverable by any one
plaintiff or for any one incident of malpractice." Several states have
adopted this approach, but the specified maximum amounts differ
considerably. A few states have enacted exceptions to the maximum
amount.9 Statutes setting a maximum amount recoverable are of course
aimed at preventing the huge recoveries that have been awarded in some
cases. Although such measures effectively achieve the goal of limiting the
amount recovered, the injured victim of medical malpractice is denied
compensatory damages for any loss beyond the statutory maximum
amount. Moreover, at least one state has eliminated punitive damages in
medical malpractice cases brought on a theory of negligence. °
8. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.2(B) (West Supp. 1977): "In no action shall the amount
of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)." IDAh1O
CODE § 39-4204 (1977) provides:
The limit of civil liability for damages of a licensed physician, as aforesaid, to or on the
account of injury to or death of any one (1) patient arising out of any treatment or course of
treatment shall be one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), and to or on account of
injury to or death of two (2) or more patients arising out of any one (1) occurrence shall be an
aggregate of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) ....
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns Supp. 1978) provides: "The total amount recoverable for any
injury or death of a patient may not exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)." ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) provides that"the maximum recovery to which the plaintiffmay
be entitled or for whichjudgment may be rendered for any plaintiff is $500,000." Note that this section
was held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63
Ill.2d 313,347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.42 (West 1977) provides that"It]he
total amount recoverable for any injury or death of a patient may not exceed five hundred thousand
dollars plus interest and costs." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-6 (Supp. 1976) provides that "[clxcept for
punitive damages and medical care and related benefits, the aggregate dollar amount recoverable by all
persons for or arising from any injury or death to a patient as a result of malpractice may not exceed five
hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) per occurrence." Omio REV. CoDE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page Supp.
1977) specifies that "[i]n no event shall an amount recovered for general damages in any medical
claim ...not involving death exceed the sum of two hundred thousand dollars." S.D. CONIPILLD
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1978) directs that "the total general damages which may be awarded shall
not exceed the sum of five hundred thousand dollars. No limitation is placed on the amount of special
damages ...."
9. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 11.02 (Veinon Supp. 1977):
(a) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment is rendered against a
physician or health care provider, the limit of civil liability for damages of that physician or
health care provider shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $500,000. (b) Subsection (a)
of this section does not apply to the amount of damages awarded on a health care liability
claim for the expenses of necessary medical, hospital and custodial care received before
judgment or required in the future for treatment of injury.
10. IDAHO CODE § 39.4210 (1977). In addition, DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6855 (Supp. 1977) allows
punitive damages "only if it is found that the injury complained of was maliciously intended orwas the
result of wilful or wanton misconduct by the health care provider ...." New Mexico and Oregon
forbid payment of punitive damages from the patient compensation fund. N.M. STAT. ANN, § 58-33-7
(Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 752.110 (1977).
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Other statutory provisions that have been adopted are aimed at
limiting financial recoveries in all cases of medical malpractice and notjust
in those likely to result in larger recoveries or punitive damages. One
measure that has been adopted for at least some cases of medical
malpractice is the abrogation of the collateral sources rule 1n which
provides that "payments from collateral sources do not reduce the amount
recoverable in a personal injury action."' 2  Some states have adopted
statutes that require the financial recovery to be reduced by the amount
received from collateral sources.' 3  On the other hand, some statutes
simply permit evidence of the amount received from collateral sources to
be introduced before the jury.'4 It is assumed that thejury, after receiving
evidence of collateral sources, will appropriately reduce the size of its
verdict. Statutes differ not only with respect to requiring or permitting the
jury verdict to be reduced by collateral sources, but also in their definitions
of collateral sources.' 5 Although there is a respectable argument that the
collateral sources rule is antiquated, it seems illogical and unwise to modify
the collateral sources rule only for medical malpractice torts.
Another measure that has received attention from legislatures during
the crisis is the ad damnum clause, that is, the portion of the plaintiffs
complaint that conveys the amount of money damages sought. A federal
11. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Supp. 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-565 (Supp. 1977);
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.50 (West Supp. 1977); IowA CODE § 147.136 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. PR.c. LAw § 4010
(McKinney Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page Supp. 1977); S. D. CO.tPILED LAwS
ANN. § 21-3-12 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1976).
12. Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 374, 183 N.E.2d 891, 892, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (1962).
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Supp. 1976):
Except when the collateral source is a federal program which by law must seek subrogation
and except death benefits paid under life insurance, a claimant may only recover damages
from the defendant which exceed amounts received by the claimant as compensation for his
injuries from collateral sources, whether private, group or governmental, and whether
contributory or noncontributory.
IOWA CODE § 147.136 (Supp. 1977) provides that
the damages awarded shall not include actual economic losses incurred or to be incurred in
the future by the claimant . . . to the extent that those losses are replaced or indemnified by
insurance, or by governmental, employment, or service benefit programs or from other
source except the assets of the claimant or of the members of the claimant's immediate family.
14. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-565 (Supp. 1977):
[Dlefendant may introduce evidence of any amount or other benefit which is or will be
payable to the plaintiff ....
Where the defendant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce
evidence of any amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure his right to any
such benefits ....
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4010 (McKinney Supp. 1977) provides that
evidence shall be admissible for consideration by the trier of the facts to establish that any
such cost or expense was replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part from any collateral
source . . . .Such evidence shall be accorded such weight as the trier of the facts chooses to
ascribe to it.
15. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1978): "[D]amages
awarded . . . shall be reduced by any public collateral source . . . ." ALAsK STAT. § 09.55.548
(Supp. 1976) provides that "a claimant may only recover damages from the defendant iwhich exceed
amounts received by the claimant as compensation for his injuries from collateral sources, %hether
private, group, or governmental, and whether contributory or noncontributory."
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commission studying the medical malpractice problem in the early 1970s
was extremely critical of ad damnum clauses. 6  Its report stated:
It is the opinion of the Commission that the astronomical amounts of
damages set forth in malpractice complaints by attorneys are an unnecessary
source of friction between the legal and medical professions. These large
demands attract sensational newspaper coverage, impose needless anxiety
and often unfounded notoriety upon defendant physicians, create a feeling of
unfair persecution in the medical world and are of no special benefit to the
plaintiff-patients. Accordingly, the Commission can see no merit but does
see probable harm in perpetuating this practice.
17
Apparently in response to such criticism, many state legislatures have
adopted statutes that prevent the use of the ad damnum clause in medical
malpractice or limit the clause to the jurisdictional amount.18 Since these
criticisms of the ad damnum clause appear to be valid for all tort com-
plaints, legislatures that eliminate the ad damnum clause only for
medical malpractice complaints seem to be selectively aiding a particular
class of defendants.
Responding to the crisis, legislatures have frequently passed
statutes assuring that any payments made by defendant to plaintiff be-
fore trial will not be introduced into evidence in a later trial or be construed
in any way as an admission of guilt on the part of the defendant.' 9
Although these statutes are common, it seems unlikely that a defendant
or his insurer will make any payments unless liability is certain.
Some legislatures have also adopted periodic (installment) payments
rather than a lump sum payment of the judgment. 0 Although insurers
16. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF TflE SECRLTARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 38 (1973). [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALI'RACTICI;
COMMISSION REPORT].
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-483 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55,547 (Supp. 1976); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West 1977 Supp.); HAW. REV. CODE § 671-4 (197(); GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-154
(1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT ANN. § 304.40-270 (Baldwin
Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60(c) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1977); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §
3017(c) (McKinney Supp. 1977); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-4 (1976 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.42C (Page Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3416 (Supp. 1977); Wis, STAT. ANN. § 655.009(1)
(West Supp. 1978).
19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-487 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.546 (Supp. 1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184b (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6861 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-9.5-2-3 (Bums Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-280 (Bildwin Supp, 1977); LA, REV.
STAT. ANN. § 50.1299.42(C) (West 1977); MD. CTS. & JVD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A08 (Supp. 1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-4 (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 40, § 13D1.512 (Purdon Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.64.010 (Supp. 1977). An example of a representative statute is ALASKA
STAT. § 09.55.546 (Supp. 1976):
In an action to recover damages under § 530-560 of this chapter, no advance payment made
by the defendant health care provider or his professional liability insurer to or on behalf of the
plaintiff is admissible as evidence or may be construed as an admission of liability for injuries
or damages suffered by the plaintiff; however, a final award in favcr of the plaintiff shall be
reduced to the extent of any advance payment.
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-486 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Supp. 1976); CAL, CIV.
PROC. CODE § 667.7(a) (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 655.015 (West Supp. 1978).
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may advocate periodic payments, 2' it is not the usual method of paying
judgments. Usually, legislatures have restricted the periodic payment
option to certain types of damages or to larger recoveries, or have
committed the matter to judicial discretion.22 There are valid arguments
that periodic payments ease the defendant's burden and that periodic
payments that terminate upon the plaintiff's death do not undercompen-
sate or overcompensate tort victims as lump sum payments do. There
appears, however, to be no valid reason for restricting periodic payments
to medical malpractice torts.
In discussions of the medical malpractice crisis, attorneys are often
perceived as the real profiteers.23 Although there is evidence that
attorneys have not ,profited excessively, 24 it is not surprising that many
legislatures have acted to curb possibly excessive contingent fees. 25 Some
legislatures have set specific limits, 26 others have adopted a policy of
"reasonable" attorneys' fees to be approved by the court.21 In addition,
some legislatures have required that attorneys offer clients an option
of paying a fee calculated on the basis of time spent on the case in lieu of
the usual contingent fee arrangement.28 Although these measures may
21. NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1978, at 10-11.
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-486 (1975):
[If a] judgment is in excess of S100.000.00 the court, in its discretion. may order that: (I)
There shall be deducted from the award, and paid to the plaintiffan amount sufficient to cover
his out-of-pocket expenses as well as his attorney's fee. (2) The remainder of the award shall
be paid to the plaintiff in monthly installments in an amount calculated to provide the
plaintiff a lifetime income.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West Supp. 1977) provides that"[The court may allow periodic payments
when] future losses exceed S200,000"; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West Supp. 1978) provides that
[i]f a settlement, arbitration award or judgment under this chapter provides for future
medical expense payments in excess of S25,000, that portion of future medical expense
payments in excess of S25,000 shall be paid into the future medical expenses fund. The
commissioner shall develop by rule a system for managing and disbursing such moneys
through periodic payment for these expenses.
23. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 16, at 32. For an insurance
advertisement depicting over 50% of a personal injury award going to an attorney on a contingent fee
arrangement, see NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1978, at 10-11.
24. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CoMIissIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 33.
25. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §20.07,at74 n.60(1977Supp.) lists
the states that have adopted restrictions on attorneys' fees for medical malpractice cases: Arizona,
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
26. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tiL 40, § 1301.604(a) (Purdon Supp. 1978), %%hich provides:
When a plaintiff is represented by an attorney in the prosecution of his claim the plaintiff's
attorney fees from any award made from the first S100,000 may not exceed 30%, from the
second $100,000 attorney fees may not exceed 25%, and attorney fees may not exceed 20( on
the balance of any award ...
IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (1977) provides that "it shall be unlawful for such attorney or attorneys to
charge orcollect an unreasonably large fee; further, such a fee, including reimbursed expenses, % hich in
the aggregate equals or exceeds forty per cent (40%) of amounts recovered or collected shall be
presumed to be unreasonable and uncollectible."
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-568 (Supp. (1977); HAw. REv. STAT. § 671-2(Supp. 1977);
WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 7.70.070 (Supp. 1977).
28. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.013 (West Supp. 1978), which provides that "an attorney
shall offer to charge any client in a malpractice proceeding or action on a per diem or per hour basis."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977) provides: "A plaintiff has the right to elect
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well benefit clients, in most cases legislatures have set rather generous lim-
its for contingent fees. It seems that these limits would only dis-
courage attorneys from taking very small claims. Of course, legislatures
that require court approval of attorneys' fees may, in reality, be imposing a
stricter standard since courts may set less generous limits.
Overall, these legislative responses seem to be a poor way to deal with
the medical malpractice crisis. From a plaintiffs perspective, the most
objectionable response is establishment of a maximum amount recover-
able. Policy arguments might be made on the wisdom of eliminating the
collateral sources rule, eliminating the ad damnum clause, or allowing
periodic payments. Legislatures, in adopting these measures for medical
malpractice cases but not other torts, seem unwilling to consider the
pervasive public policy issues in their haste to resolve the malpractice
crisis.
II. SUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATION
The report of the Commission on Medical Malpractice 29 was
submitted in 1973, before the medical malpractice problem ripened to a
crisis in 1975 and 1976. Thus, the report's credibility and impact may have
been enhanced. The Commission recommended legislative modifications
in five areas to alter case law that had become, at least in the Commission's
view, too favorable to plaintiffs. The five areas included (1) the length of
the statute of limitations, (2) the discovery rule under the statute of
limitations, (3) the doctrine of informed consent, (4) the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, and (5) liability for breach of express contracts. 0  Not
surprisingly, initial legislative attempts to stem the malpractice crisis
modified not only the locality rule but also the substantive law in these
areas. These substantive changes were designed to make plaintiffs'
recoveries more difficult and could even eliminate their causes of action
altogether.
A. Statute of Limitations
Some states have recently shortened their statutes of limitations for
medical malpractice claims.31 In addition, many states now limit the time
that minors have to bring suit. 32 The statutory modification with greatest
to pay for the attorney's services on a mutually satisfactory per diem basis." IND. CoDEANN. § 16-9.5-
5-lb (Burns Supp. 1978) provides: "A patient has the right to elect to pay for the attorney's services on a
mutually satisfactory per diem basis. The election, however, must be exercised in written form at the
time of employment."
29. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16.
30. Id. at 27-31.
31. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 13, at 176-220 for the text of the new
statute of limitations. For example, Florida modified its statute of limitations for medical
malpractice cases (based on a negligence theory) from four to two years and Mississippi likewise
shortened its statute from six to two years.
32. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-564 (Supp. 1977) ("[T]he applicable period of limitations
(Vol. 39:855
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impact, however, has been elimination of the discovery rule or its
restriction to a specified number of years.33 Under the discovery rule, the
statute of limitations commences with the time the tort was or should have
been discovered.34 The discovery rule is helpful to a plaintiff who is aware
of a continuing medical problem such as abdominal pain but unaware that
the cause of the pain is a surgical sponge that was not removed during
previous surgery.35 Although it is difficult for a medical malpractice claim
to be defended years after the incident, it is also impossible for plaintiffs to
bring suits before discovering the source of their medical problems. Out
of concern for the problems of creating a defense, legislatures adopting this
measure may be eliminating valid claims. A more reasonable legislative
approach, although it is not completely free from difficulty, is the retention
of the discovery rule when there has been intentional concealment of
malpractice by the physician or a foreign object has been unintentionally
left inside the patient.3 6  Even this more limited statutory provision,
however, might eliminate valid claims to which the discovery rule could
apply.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Another doctrine that has received attention during the medical
malpractice crisis has been res ipsa loquitur, a term that describes a type of
circumstantial evidence.37 In order to use res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff
usually has to meet the following requirements:
(1) The event must be of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence;
(2) It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within exclusive con-
trol of the defendant;
begins to run when the minor reaches his or her seventh birthday or on death, whichever occurs
earlier."); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1977) ("[A] minor who has not attained his
tenth birthday shall have until his fourteenth birthday [to bring suit].")
33. For a general discussion of the timing of state statutes of limitations, see I D. Louts- L & H.
WILLIAMS, supra note 25, §§ 13.06-09, at 369-78. For examples of limitations even when the
negligence might be undiscovered, see DEL CODE tit. 18, § 6856 (Supp. 1977), which provides that
solely in the event of personal injury the occurrence of which during such period of 2 years
was unknown to and could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by
the injured person, such action may be brought prior to expiration of 3 years from the date
upon which such injury occurred ....
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West Supp. 1978) ("[Ijn no event [shall the bringing ofaction]exceed
seven years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred."); LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 9-
5628 (West 1977) ("[I]n all events such claims must be filed at the latest within a period of three years
from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.").
34. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRsT § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935).
36. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1978): "In no event shall the time for
commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following (1) upon proof
of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body ... "
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 39, at 213.
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(3) It must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff."
Although there has been general agreement on the requirements for
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, there has3 been less agreement
on its procedural effect.
39
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be especially useful for plaintiffs
in medical malpractice cases. Patients do not have knowledge of the
manner in which unexplained injuries were received, especially if they were
unconscious during treatment. For example, plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases have used the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when objects
were left in a patient's body during surgery,40 when an injury occurred to a
part of the body remote from the treatment area, 41 or when unexplained
42burns were received during the course of treatment.
The issue of res ipsa loquitur has been litigated in an increasing
number of appellate decisions; some jurisdictions have expanded the
doctrine.43 In light of these trends, the federal Commission on Medical
Malpractice hoped that "doctrines like res ipsa loquitur [would] not be
expanded judicially to the point where liability of health care providers is
based solely on circumstantial evidence of negligence. 44 The Commis-
sion, however, did not advocate complete elimination of this doctrine but
felt that it should be applied in the same way in medical malpractice as in
other areas of tort law.45
Although there have been several proposals for restricting the
availability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,46 only a few legislatures have
actually passed statutory provisions. One approach adopted by at least
two legislatures has been the enactment of statutes that specifically enum-
erate the factual situations in which res ipsa loquitur can be used.47
38. Id. at 214. Prosser noted that in addition to the three condtions that "some courts have at
least suggested a fourth condition, that evidence as to the true explanation of the event must be more
readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff." Id.
39. Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Casey, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 852,854(1966). For an earlier discussion ofres ipsa loquitar, see Louisell &Williams, Res
Ipsa Loquitur-lts Future in Medical Malpractice, 48 CAL. L. REv. 252 (1960).
40. Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935),
41. Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 P. 134 (1929); Thomsen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal,
App. 2d 235, 79 P.2d 136 (1938).
42. Meyer v. McNutt Hosp., 173 Cal. 156,159 P. 436 (1916); Timbrell v. Suburban Hosp., 4 Cal,
2d 68, 47 P.2d 737 (1935).
43. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CoINissIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 29. The Commission
reported that res ipsa loquitur was considered in 13.4% of the appllate court cases decided in the
period 1961-1971 as compared to 6.3% of the cases decided prior to 1950.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Comment, supra note 3, at 677.
47. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 41A.100 (1977):
[A] rebuttable presumption that personal injury or death was caused by negligence arises
where evidence is presented that the personal injury or death occurred in any one o? more of
the following circumstances: (a) a foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic
device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery; (b) an
[Vol. 39:855
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Unfortunately, it is very hard to enumerate all the factual situations in
which the res ipsa doctrine would be appropriate. Another statutory
provision, adopted by Texas, expressly states that the "doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur shall only apply to health care liability claims against health care
providers or physicians in those cases in which it has been applied by the
appellate courts of this State as of this subchapter. ' '48  In essence, Texas
wants no further expansion of the doctrine. These partial limitations on
res ipsa are responsive to the Commission's concerns, for complete
elimination might prevent a plaintiff from proving a valid claim of
malpractice. Nevertheless, the statutes that enumerate fact situations
probably still present difficulty for certain plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who possess
the traditional common-law prerequisites for the application of the
doctrine but lack the specific fact situation required by the statute lose the
use of a valuable doctrine and possibly the lawsuit.4 9 It would be better for
legislatures to concentrate on formulating the necessary prerequisites for
general application of this tort doctrine instead of enumerating special
medical malpractice fact situations to which it can be applied.
C. Doctrine of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent provides that "when a patient gives
his express consent to a surgical procedure or a particular course of
therapy the physician may nevertheless be held liable if the patient can
show that he was not adequately informed of the risks and consequences of
the operative procedure or course of therapy." 50  The basis of this
doctrine, in the words of Judge Cardozo, is that "a person has a right to
determine what will be done with his own body."5'
Although it is difficult to dispute the patient's right to make informed
decisions regarding his body, concern has been expressed about the recent
evolution of the doctrine of informed consent.52 For example, one article
has commented that the doctrine of informed consent evolved in some
jurisdictions from a physician's "duty not to make material misrepresenta-
tion concerning potential dangers to a duty to reveal all possible untoward
explosion or fire originating in a substance used in treatment occurred in the course of
treatment; (c) an unintended burn caused by heat, radiation or chemicals was suffered in the
course of medical care; (d) an injury was suffered during the course of treatment to a part of
the body not directly involved in such treatment or proximate thereto; or (c) a surgical
procedure was performed on the wrong patient or the wrong organ, limb or part of a patient's
body.
See also DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6853 (Supp. 1977).
48. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1978).
49. It has been suggested that "res ipsa cases are easy for a plaintiff to present and enjoy a high
measure of success." Comment, supra note 3, at 677.
50. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMNussIoN REPORT, supra note 16. at 29.
51. Schloendoffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
52. See Plant, The Medical Malpractice Crisis, 20 LAw QUADRANGLE NoTEs 12 (U. of Mich.
Winter 1976).
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results."53 Alsobrook, citing four recent cases, 54 has suggested that the
doctrine of informed consent is evolving from a medical standard to a legal
standard." Originally, the standard for informed consent was what
physicians in the community or similar communitie3 would disclose to the
patient. Hence, expert testimony was needed. Recently, some jurisdic-
tions have formulated the standard of informed consent to emphasize what
the patient needs to know instead of what physicians normally disclose.
When the emphasis is on the patient's need to know, expert testimony is
not required to establish the standard.56 The Commission on Medical
Malpractice pointed to an increasing number of cases employing the
informed consent doctrine. 57 The Commission's specific concern centered
upon "evidence that courts are beginning to apply the doctrine unevenly in
order to hold a physician liable when the patient's injury is severe but he
lacks sufficient evidence to prove the physician was negligent.""SB The
Commission, therefore, did not wish to eliminate the doctrine of informed
consent but did hope to eliminate its "uneven application."5 9 Although
perspectives may differ on the evolution of the informed consent doctrine,
there is general agreement that the doctrine has become increasingly useful
to plaintiffs. In fact, one authority has commented that the doctrine has
grown so favorable to plaintiffs that it has become routine to include a
count charging lack of informed consent in any medical malpractice
complaint.60
Several states have enacted statutes that make the doctrine of
informed consent less favorable to plaintiffs.61 One approach has been to
codify limitations on the doctrine and possible defenses. For example,
the New York statute
creates several limitations. First, such cases may be brought only after non-
emergency therapy or diagnostic procedures which involve invasion or
53. Comment, supra note 3, at 675.
54. Canterberry v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502
P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Fogal v,
Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, aff'd mem., 345 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1973).
55. Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 580 (1973). For
additional discussion of the informed consent doctrine, see Marks, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice Cases, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DEFENSE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASTS 57 (D.
Hirsch ed. 1977); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970).
56. Alsobrook, supra note 55, at 587. Alsobrook notes that although expert testimony is not
necessary to establish the standard, it still is important in deciding the "ultimate issue." Id.
57. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 29,
58. Id.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Plant, supra note 52, at 15.
61. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (Supp. 1976); DEL. COD3 tit. 18, § 6852 (Supp. 1977);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.132 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1976); IDA1O0 CODE §§ 39-
4301 to 4306 (1977); IOWA CODE § 147.137 (Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 40.1299.40 (West
1977); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805d (McKinney 1977); NEV. REV. SIAT. §§ 41A-1 10 to 120 (1977);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (Supp. 1977); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 23-3417 (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-14-5 (1977).
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disruption of the integrity of the body. Second, expert medical testimony is
required and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove lack of informed
consent. Third, it sets up four defenses (common knowledge of the risk;
patient's willingness to take the risk or unwillingness to be informed of it;
consent not reasonably possible; reasonable expectation of adverse effect of
disclosure) not always recognized by the courts.62
Another approach to informed consent has been to formalize the
procedural significance of consent forms signed by patients. For example,
Iowa prescribes specifications that a written consent must meet;63 if the
requirements are met, there is a rebuttable presumption that informed
consent has been given.64 Louisiana has gone even further and established
a signed consent form that creates a presumption of informed consent that
can only be rebutted by evidence that the signing of the form "was induced
by misrepresentation of material facts. 6 5
There has been general criticism of the judicial evolution of the
informed consent doctrine. 66  On the other hand, the use of a written
consent form to establish a statutory presumption of informed consent
deserves censure. A hospitalized patient is not likely to demand, or even
understand, his legal rights; "[a] routine procedure established by law to
obtain a consensual signature does not guarantee that a patient has
knowledgeably agreed to treatment.6  There can be reasonable
disagreement about the wisdom of a statute such as New York's,68 which
clearly allows the medical community to set the standards for informed
consent. This writer believes that legislatures should not accord such
power to the medical community despite the malpractice crisis. Patients'
rights would appear to be much better protected when the standard for
informed consent is formulated by a less self-interested group than the
medical community.
62. Plant, supra note 52, at 15.
63. IOWA CODE § 147.137 (Supp. 1977). This statutory provision requires that a written consent,
in order to create the presumption,
1. [s]ets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or procedures
together with the known risks if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia,
the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or disfiguringscars associated with such
procedure or procedures, with the probability of each such risk as reasonably
determinable.
2. Acknowledges that the disclosure of information has been made and that all questions
asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a satisfactory manner.
3. Is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if the patient for
any reason lacks legal capacity to consent, is signed by a person who has legal authority to
consent on behalf of that patient in those circumstances.
64. Id.
65. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1977).
66. See, e.g., Plant, supra note 52, at 15.
67. Comment, supra note 3, at 678.
68. This statute has been described as an "improvement in the present situation." Plant, supra
note 52, at 15.
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D. Locality Rule
During the crisis, legislatures have become concerned with the locality
rule. In its earliest form, the locality rule provided that a physician should
be held only to the standard of care that prevailed in the very community in
which he practiced.69 This rule completely shielded s;ole practitioners in a
community from liability. Even in communities with more than one
physician, however, it was extremely difficult for plaintiffs to elicit expert
testimony on community standards because of the well-known "conspir-
acy of silence" among physicians.7" Some jurisdictions never accepted
this earliest version of the locality rule, apparently because of its
harshness. Gradually, most jurisdictions adopted a standard of care that
related to prevailing practices in similar communities. 7' Even this
modified version of the locality rule was whittled away by exceptions; the
complete demise of the locality rule had in fact been predicted.72
The medical malpractice crisis has created a resurgence in the locality
rule. In order to emphasize that physicians should only be held to the
standard of care prevalent in the same or a similar community, a few states
have codified the locality rule.73 At least one state legislature enacted the
locality rule as the standard of medical care available in either the
community or the state, as "appropriate.
74
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 32, at 164; Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall ofthe Localit'
Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 408 (1969). For additional discussion of
the locality rule, see Decyk & Hirsch, The Medical Standard of Care, in DEFENSE RESEARC11 INSTITUTE,
DEFENSE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 29 (D. Hirsch ed. 1977); Comment, Medical Malpractice-
The Locality Rule and the Conspiracy of Silence, 22 S. C. L. REV. 810 (1970).
70. Comment, supra note 69, at 817.
71. Id.
72. "[I]t is a safe prognostication of the law's future direction to say the locality rule, long in the
process of shrinking, will gradually disappear almost completely." Waltz, supra note 69, at 415.
73. Alabama requires "such reasonable care, diligence and skill as physicians, surgeons, and
dentists in the same general neighborhood, or the same general line ofpractice . ALA. CODt tit,
6, § 5-484 (1975). The Louisiana standard is
the degree of knowledge or skill possessed or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by
physicians or dentists practicing in the same community or locali,:y to that in which the
defendant practices; and where the defendant practices in a particular specialty and where
the alleged acts of medical negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty
involved then the plaintiffhas the burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily practiced by
physicians or dentists within the involved medical specialty.
LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 9-2794 (West Supp. 1978). Tennessee prescribes "the recognized standard of
acceptable professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof, if any, that the defendant
practices in the community in which he practices or in a similar community at the time the alleged
injury or wrongful death occurred." TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3414 (Supp. 1977).
74.
[The standard of care to be applied is] the degree of skill and diligence practiced by a
reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice or specialty in this Commonwealth;
provided, however, that the standard ofcare in the locality or in similar localities in which the
alleged act or omission occurred may be applied if, after considering the health care services
and health care facilities available in such locality or similar localities and the customary
practice in such locality or other similar localities, it is determined that the local standard of
care is more appropriate than the statewide standard.
VA. CODE § 8.01-5.81.12:1 (1977).
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Although codifications of the locality rule might perhaps be defended
as a realistic appraisal of the degree of expertise a patient can expect from a
physician, they are nevertheless highly vulnerable to criticism. With
improved educational opportunities and communication 75 there is little
justification for a small town doctor to be less expert than a metropolitan
area doctor claiming the same degree of specialization. Although
facilities in some small towns might perhaps be underequipped, modem
transportation ordinarily allows access to better-equipped facilities.
Furthermore, these codifications impede achievement of higher standards.
"Where the standard of care in a community lags behind modem medical
developments to the point that the whole medical community's practice
approaches negligence, the locality rule becomes unfair. 7 6 Legislatures
contemplating revival of the locality rule should critically consider its
ramifications.
E. Breach of Contract
The Commission on Medical Malpractice expressed concern about
the use of contract theory in medical malpractice cases.77 Typically, a
contract action in medical malpractice alleges a breach by the physician of
an oral promise for good results or cure. The Commission found that
"[w]ith increasing frequency 7 8 plaintiffs were turning to a contract theory
of recovery, especially when the statute of limitations had run on their
negligence actions. Statutes of limitations are generally longer for contract
actions than for negligence actions. 7 9 The Commission succinctly stated its
concern:
Where an oral guarantee of good results is actually made and proved, the
courts have permitted recovery of damages on the basis of breach of contract.
In some instances, however, courts are unfairly allowing stale malpractice
cases to be pursued under a contract theory solely to permit damages to be
awarded to injured patients. While those cases are few in number, the
Commission is concerned that they do not become a precedent that would
expand unduly the area of professional liability."'
Although the Commission did not make specific recommendations,
some states have adopted a statute of frauds provision to permit an action
based on a promise of good results only if the promise is in writing.81
75. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 32, at 165, comments that these societal changes led to the
"abandonment" of any fixed locality rule.
76. Comment, supra note 3, at 678.
77. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Co.iMIssION REPORT, supra note 16, at 30.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.547 (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6851 (Supp. 1977);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.01 (West Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-4 (Bums Supp. 1978); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §304.40-300 (Baldwin Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STT. A, .§40:1299.41C(West 1977);
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These measures do allow a physician to be optimistic and provide
psychological support without fear of a lawsuit. On the other hand, a
physician may have induced a patient to use his services by unfulfilled,
perhaps unfulfillable, promises of success. Patients are likely to be
unaware of the statutory requirement, or reluctant to ask the physician for
a writing. Therefore, such statutes effectively eliminate a contractual
cause of action for breach of a promise of good results. A more carefully
drafted statutory provision might address concerns expressed by the
Commission on Medical Malpractice without eliminating a valid cause of
action in contract. For example, the statute of limitations for breach of an
express contract in medical malpractice cases could be made coterminous
with the statute of limitations for the negligence action. A plaintiff would
thus be unable to pursue a stale negligence claim in the guise of a contract
action, but contract theory would remain available when specific facts
warrant its use.
F. Summary
To be fair, substantive law must reflect the competing equities of
plaintiffs and defendants in medical malpractice cases. Legislatures,
however, have tended to enact statutes that disproportionately favor
defendants. Because substantive law changes may completely eliminate a
plaintiff's cause of action, they have potentially greater impact on the
affected plaintiffs than statutory provisions that limit financial recovery.
An equitable solution to the medical malpractice crisis will not be
achieved by eliminating valid recoveries. Because of the possibly severe
impact of these changes in substantive tort law, legislatures should
carefully consider the consequences of such modifications.
III. SCREENING PANELS AND ARBITRATION BOARDS
A. Screening Panels
In the wake of the medical malpractice crisi;, many states have
formulated screening panels to evaluate the validity of claims prior to
trial.82 Although their structures and procedural effects vary,83 the panels
are designed to eliminate litigation and thereby reduce costs.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.606 (Purdon Supp,
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-6 (1977).
82. Screening panels have been adopted by statute in the following states: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 2 D. LoUIsELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, §20.07, at 74 n.61,
83. For discussion of screening panels, see A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 408-13 (2d
ed. 1977); Gibbs, The Montana Planfor Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, 36 MONT. L. Rrv, 321
(1975); Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions It Raises, II
U. RICH. L. REV. 51 (1976); Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial
Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974); Comment,
supra note 3; Comment, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical
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It has been suggested that screening panels will weed out invalid
claims. 4 Plaintiffs retain the option of proceeding to trial even when the
panel's finding has not been favorable to them, but unfavorable findings by
screening panels may discourage plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.
85
On the other hand, screening panels can encourage settlement of valid
claims. If the panel's finding is unfavorable to the defendant, the
defendant or, in the usual case, the defendant's insurer is more likely to
settle a valid claim without litigation. 6
Although the purpose of screening panels is to reduce costs, it is
nevertheless possible that employment of mandatory screening panels
might actually increase costs. 8 7 If the screening panel becomes a required
additional step in the litigation process, then panel-related expenditures
for expert testimony and attorneys' time could significantly increase the
cost of bringing or defending medical malpractice actions. Only if it
effectively eliminates later litigation can the screening panel reduce costs.
The effectiveness of the screening panel has not been conclusively
demonstrated, but a study was recently undertaken to compare screening
panels in New Mexico, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.88 The
study's major conclusion was that the panel must be mandatory for all
medical malpractice cases in order to be effective, since nonmandatory
panels are ignored. 9 In addition, the study stressed that the panel "must
be equitable and offer the parties and their attorneys a real alternative to a
jury trial."90
Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 695 (1972); Note, 77te Aew Afexico Medico-Legal
Malpractice Panel-An Analysis, 3 NEw MEx. L. REV. 311 (1973).
84. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 408; Comment, supra note 3, at 679.
85. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 410; Comment, supra note 3, at 681.
86. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 409-10.
87. Comment, supra note 3, at 681. See Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liabilitiesfor
Products, 9 THE REPORTER 3, 11 (1978) fora discussion of'screening panels in products liability cases.
88. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATIoN AND AMERICAN BAR A5sOcIATION, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE PANELS IN FOUR STATES (1977) [hereinafter cited as MALPRACTICE PANELS].
89. Id. at 42.
90. Id. Although this study concluded that the data were insufficient to determine precisely how
screening affected case disposition, it identified characteristics of the panels that disposed of the
greatest number of cases. The study recommended that panels should be mandatory for all medical
malpractice claims, and proposed the following:
1. Panels must decide liability and damages
2. Legislation must give "teeth" to panel findings
3. The panel chairperson must be disposition-oriented and have the authority to
control the procedure
4. Panel members must have medical and legal expertise
5. Panelists' performances must be reviewed
6. Parties must be able to object to panelists for due cause
7. Materials must be as complete as the expert panelists think necessary
8. Procedures must be informal with open questioning and discussion
9. Panels must discuss all findings with the parties
10. Panel hearings and their findings should be confidential
11. Complete data must be kept on panel outcomes
12. Panelists should be given immunity from civil suit for actions performed in
connection with panel duties
13. Panel members, except the chairperson, need not be paid.
Id. at 39-42.
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Unlike legislative modifications discussed earlier in this Comment,
impartial screening panels could eventually benefit both plaintiffs and
defendants. Although their effectiveness has yet to be confirmed
empirically, screening panels seem fairer than the harsh and mechanical
statutory limitations on causes of action and recoveries that have recent-
ly been adopted by legislatures attempting to cope with the malprac-
tice dilemma.
B. Arbitration Boards
Arbitration boards have also been proposed to reduce litigation in
medical malpractice cases9 and are in fact available in several states. 92 It
is crucial, however, to distinguish between binding and nonbinding
arbitration. After an unfavorable nonbinding arbitration decision, the
plaintiff is free to pursue his case in a trial de novo. Hence, a system of
nonbinding arbitration is indistinguishable from a screening panel
system.93 A plaintiff who agrees to binding arbitration must abide by the
decision of the arbitration board and forego any judicial remedies.
Statutory schemes differ in their requirements of when the victim must
agree to binding arbitration. The plaintiff who agrees to binding
arbitration after the injury has occurred is likely to have consulted with an
attorney about the desirability of arbitration. Attorneys, however, are
likely to recommend against arbitration unless the board is perceived as
impartial and its awards are commensurate with jury verdicts.9"
Additionally, attorneys are likely to be wary of binding arbitration since
there is no right of appeal.96 When the statute permits post-injury
election, contact with counsel educates the patient about the availability of
binding arbitration but at the same time serves to dissuade the patient from
electing arbitration.
More difficult issues are raised by statutory schemes that allow the
plaintiff to agree to binding arbitration prior to the incident of alleged
medical malpractice. 97 Typically, patients sign the agreement for binding
91. For discussion of arbitration, see A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 413-20; Coulson, Arbitration
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 3 Omo N. L. REv. 507 (1975); Henderson, Contractual Problems In
the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. RLv, 947 (1972);
Comment, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. R V. 1285 (1976).
92. Arbitration for medical malpractice claims has been the subject of legislation in the following
states: Alabama, Alaska, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. For an overview of these arbitration systems, see Ladimer, Statutory
Provisions for Binding Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 1976 INS, L. J. 405.
93. Comment, supra note 3, at 682.
94. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 413.
95. The Institute of Judicial Administration reported that attorneys tended to "distrust"
screening panels and did not use them unless they were made mandatory. It seems likely that the same
would be true of arbitration boards. MALPRACTICE PANELS, supra note 88, at 39.
96. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 413.
97. For an example of a statutory provision allowing an agreement to arbitrate to be formulated
prior to treatment, see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.22-.24 (Page Supp. 1977). Under the statute, the
patient has a right to withdraw from the agreement within a specified period of time.
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arbitration as part of the routine procedure for admission to a hospital. In
an empilical study conducted in California, "400,000 patients in the 9
participating hospitals signed arbitration clauses on the admissions form
and only 200-300 refused to do so.'98 Those who refused were "lawyers,
lawyers' wives and legal secretaries." 99 One commentator has suggested
that "this group was the only one operating with any genuine
understanding of the implications of the clause."'' 1 Patients signing these
arbitration agreements prior to treatment probably do not understand that
they are foregoing their right to judicial remedies in the event of medical
malpractice.
Since the understanding and possibly even the voluntariness of pre-
treatment consent to arbitration is questionable, grave doubts are raised
about its constitutionality. Whatever the disposition of the constitutional
issues, the effectiveness of binding arbitration has yet to be precisely
determined. Although binding arbitration, like the screening panel,
inherently favors neither plaintiff nor defendant, boards might possibly be
biased in actual operation. The use of arbitration systems to resolve
medical malpractice disputes deserves further study.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The constitutionality of tort law modifications relating to medical
malpractice has been questioned extensively by commentators.10 1 Few
state high courts have rendered decisions on point; lower courts have split,
even within a given state.'0 2  The United States Supreme Court has not
yet spoken, but might conceivably address these issues before too long.
A. Constitutionality of Screening Panels
The legislative innovation most frequently subjected to constitutional
challenge is the screening panel,103 which, from a plaintiff's perspective,
would seem one of the less objectionable contemporary tort law
modifications. Perhaps the novelty and broad impact of the screening
98. A. HOLDER, supra note 83, at 418.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Harlan, supra note 83; Note, Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana
Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143 (1975); Note, T/ze Indiana Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on
Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. Rev. 303 (1976); Note, Medical Malpractice-Constitutionality of
Limits on Liability, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 381 (1975).
102. For a discussion of decisions in Ohio, see Knepper, Review of 1976 Tort Trends, 26 DEF.
L.J. 1, 15 (1977).
103. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d
802 (Fla. 1976); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111. 2d 313,347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Paro %.
Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,256 N.W.2d 657
(1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
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panels have attracted these attacks, which have for the most part proved
unsuccessful. 104
Some jurisdictions require mandatory submission of the claim to the
panel before a complaint may be filed. It has been argued that such
mandatory submission is a denial or restriction of the right of access to the
courts. The Nebraska Supreme Court in Prendergast v. Nelson l0
rebutted this argument: "Claimants are not denied access to the courts
[but] merely required to follow a certain procedure before submitting their
claims to the courts." The Florida Supreme 'Court, in Carter v.
Sparkman,0 6 expressed similar sentiments: "Although courts are
generally opposed to any burden being placed on the rights of aggrieved
persons to enter the courts because of the constitutional guaranty of
access, there may be reasonable restrictions prescribed by law."
An equal protection argument has also been utilized: medical
malpractice victims are denied equal protection because the law requires
mandatory submission of their claims to panels and does not require
submission of claims of other tort victims. Two courts that have
entertained the equal protection challenge found that screening panels did
not violate equal protection. 10 7  Both courts found the classification
permissible under the rational basis test."8
Plaintiffs in Paro v. Longwood Hospital raised an argument of
substantive due process, contending that a legislature can not abrogate a
common law right without providing a substitute."' The court believed
that introduction of the screening panel did not change any substantive
rights but merely modified the procedure that a plaintiff must follow.
Even assuming, arguendo, that substantive rights had been eliminated,
the Paro court suggested that the panel would serve as an effective
substitute and thus invalidate the substantive due process objection to the
screening panel."0
It has been urged that the screening panel is an unconstitutional
usurpation of judicial authority. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected
this argument, holding that there was no violation because the plaintiff
could obtain a trial de novo."' One court, however, has found the
screening panel unconstitutional on a similar theory. The Illinois
104. The screening panel was, however, found unconstitutional in Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
105. 199 Neb. 97, 103, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663 (1977).
106. 335 So.2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976).
107. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
108. "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
109. 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Mass. 1977).
110. Id.
111. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580-81, 570 P.2d 744, 748.49 (1977).
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Supreme Court found that the panel had been impermissibly vested with a
judicial function that, according to the state constitution, must be vested
exclusively in the courts.1 2 In making its ruling, the Illinois court may
have taken into account the specific functions and characteristics of the
Illinois panel. The Illinois legislature had provided that the panel should
make its decision according to substantive law and determine damages.
Furthermore, the plaintiff and the defendant could choose to be bound by
the panel's decision.1 3 The court, having found that the panel had been
unconstitutionally vested with ajudicial function, said that it followed that
the panel was an impermissible restriction on the right to trial by jury.1'4
The Illinois court left the door open, however: "Because we have held that
these statutes providing for medical review panels are unconstitu-
tional . . we do not imply that a valid pretrial panel procedure cannot
be devised."1' 5
It has been asserted that to allow submission of paners findings as
evidence in subsequent jury trials denies the constitutional right to trial by
jury. The argument is that the jury will be unduly influenced by the panel's
finding and will be unable to render a truly independentjudgment.' 6 The
courts facing this argument have concluded, however, that juries would be
able to maintain a proper perspective on the weight to be accorded the
panel's findings. 1
17
Although screening panels per se have generally been found
constitutional, objectionable features of particular screening panel
procedures have been struck down. For example, the Arizona statute
requirement to be a violation of access to the courts and therefore
before proceeding to trial. The Arizona Supreme Court found the bond
requirement to be a violation of access to the courts and therefore
unconstitutional.' The Florida Supreme Court construed the Florida
statute to avoid an equal protection violation. The statute allowed the
screening panel's finding to be admitted into evidence at a later trial when
the plaintiff and defendant had both participated in the hearing before the
screening panel. The Florida statute was silent, however, about the effect
of a defendant's nonparticipation in the screening panel's proceedings.
The Florida court construed the statute to allow the fact of the
112. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313, 321-22, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-41
(1976).
113. For a brief overview of the Illinois panel and a discussion of the Wright case, see Stewart,
Constitutionality of Remedial Legislation in the Field of Professional Liability, 18 FOR Tl E Du-ssE 73
(1977).
114. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313, 324,347 N.E.2d 736,741 (1976).
115. Id.
116. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 581,470 P.2d 744, 749 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson,
199 Neb. 97, 109-10, 256 N.W.2d 657, 666 (1977).
117. Id.
118. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 585-86, 570 P.2d 744, 753-54 (1977).
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defendant's nonparticipation in the screening panel's proceedings to be
admitted into evidence at a later trial."19
B. Constitutionality of Limitations on Recovery
In Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital ° the Illinois Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality under the Illinois and federal constitu-
tions of the Illinois statutory provision limiting recovery in medical
malpractice actions to $500,000. Plaintiffs had argued that the law
denied equal protection because it drew an impermissible distinction
between them and less seriously injured victims of medical malpractice
who could recover fully. The court agreed and found the provision
violative of the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The court
declined to consider whether the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution.1
2 1
The North Dakota statutory recovery limit of $300,000 was
challenged in Arneson v. Olson.'22 The North Dakota Supreme Court
found that this statutory ceiling on recovery violated the equal protection
clause not only of the state constitution but also of the United States
Constitution. 123 When Idaho's statutory ceiling on medical malpractice
recovery was challenged, in Jones v. State Board of Medicine,124 the Idaho
Supreme Court faced both equal protection and substantive due process
arguments. The Idaho Supreme Court avoided ruling on the merits and
remanded the case for further factfinding and conclusions.
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court, deciding Prendergast v.
Nelson,'25 upheld the constitutionality of the state statutory limitation of
recovery to $500,000, its decision is not necessarily inconsistent with
Arneson, Wright, and Jones because the Nebraska statute clearly differs
from the statutory provisions in Illinois, North Dakota, and Idaho. In
Nebraska, the statutory limit on recovery is elective. If the plaintiff
chooses to proceed under the Hospital-Medical Liability Act and hence be
assured of the availability of funds for any judgment, he must agree to the
recovery limitation. If, however, the plaintiff does not follow Hospital-
Medical Liability Act procedure, he is not bound by any upper limit.
Although this statutory limit was challenged as a special privilege, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in rejecting this challenge emphasized the
elective nature of the limit.
26
119. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976).
120. 63 111. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
121. Id. at 329-30, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
122. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
123. Id. at 135-36.
124. 97 Idaho 859, 876, 555 P.2d 399, 416 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977),
125. 199 Neb. 97, 114-15, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668-69 (1977).
126. Id.
[Vol. 39:855
1978] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Two of the few constitutional challenges to statutory ceilings on
recovery for medical malpractice have been clearly successful. Thus, the
constitutionality of such ceilings, especially if they are mandatory, is
questionable.
C. Constitutionality of Other Provisions
Other provisions of the legislation spawned by the malpractice crisis
have been challenged sporadically. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held that a provision authorizing periodic payments from the patient
compensation fund when awards exceeded one million dollars was
reasonable and did not violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause. 127  Two recent cases upheld the constitutionality of statutes of
limitations 28 but in neither was elimination or restriction of the discovery
rule at issue.
129
The constitutionality of the abrogation of the collateral sources rule
also has been challenged.130  The Arizona Supreme Court found the
provision allowing evidence of collateral sources violated neither the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution nor
the provision of the state constitution that proscribed limits on recoveries
for personal injuries or death.'3 ' The Nebraska statute governing
127. State exrel. Strykowskiv. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d491, 261 N.W.2d434(1978). TheWisconsin
statutory scheme allowed periodic payments from the patient compensation fund established for the
benefit of malpractice victims. The court held that "[d]elayed payment of very large awards is not
inimical to the interest of the claimant, and protects the fund from the effect ofcatastrophicawards or
judgments which would otherwise threaten the solvency of the fund. These provisions are
reasonable." Id. at 511, 261 N.W.2d at 443.
128. Cioffi v. Guenther, 370 N.E.2d 1003 (Mass. 1977); Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244
N.W.2d 201 (1976). In Taylor, the plaintiff attempted to bring the lawsuit after the statute of
limitations had run. The court in its opinion specifically expressed approval of the discovery rule but
noted that the facts of the case did not indicate any difficulty in discovering the alleged negligence.
Specifically, the court held that the two year statute of limitations did not violate the state constitution
as special legislation even though this statute of limitations was only applicable to "professional
negligence." The court also held that this statute was not void for vagueness.
The Cioffi case presented a more difficult issue. The applicable Massachusetts statute of
limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1976 imposed a three year limitation, but a minor had until his
eighteenth birthday to bring his action. In 1975, however, the legislature approved a new statute of
limitations effective January 1, 1976. This new statute still allowed a three year limitation, but a minor
under the age of six was given only until his ninth birthday to bring an action. Plaintiff brought an
action on December 28, 1976 for an alleged act of negligence that had occurred in 1971 %;hen he was
nine. Plaintiff argued in vain that the statute of limitations that became effective on January 1, 1976
could not constitutionally be applied to him. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a shortened
statute of limitations can constitutionally be applied to an accrued cause of action as long as sufficient
time is allowed after the enactment ofthe statute of limitations for persons to bring their action. In this
case the court held that the legislature had allowed sufficient time and therefore the statute was
applicable to the plaintiff.
129. For a lower state court decision on this issue, see Woodward v. Burnham City Hosp., 60 Il1.
App. 3d 285,377 N.E.2d 290 (1978), holding the fouryearstatute oflimitations for medical malpractice
unconstitutional as special legislation violative of the Illinois constitution.
130. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583-85, 570 P.2d 744, 751-53 (1977); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 115-17, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977).
131. 116 Ariz. 576, 583-85, 570 P.2d 744, 751-53 (1977). The Arizona Supreme Court stated
that this statutory provision did not deprive the plaintiffof any property protected by due processand
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collateral sources has also been challenged. In Nebraska if the plaintiff
elects to proceed under the Hospital-Medical Act procedure and be
assured of funds for any judgment, the statute requires that any recovery
be reduced by any nonrefundable insurance benefits that the plaintiff
receives.1 32  The Nebraska Supreme Court held that this statute did not
violate the state constitution's stricture against impairment of the
obligation of contract. The court concluded there was nothing in this
collateral sources rule that impaired any contract, and commented
favorably that the legislative purpose was to avoid windfalls for the
plaintiff.133 In the same decision, the court held that the legislature had the
power to subject attorneys' fees to court review. 134
D. Arneson v. Olson: A Change of Direction?
Although the few decisions in the highest state courts show a clear
trend toward finding tort law modifications constitutional, one recent case,
Arneson v. Olson, 35 swims against this tide. North Dakota's medical
malpractice statute, like most, dealt with several problems simultaneously.
It imposed a ceiling on recovery and modified the doctrines of informed
consent, res ipsa loquitur, and collateral sources. Rather than analyzing
the constitutionality of each of these provisions separately as other courts
had done, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the cumulative
effect of these provisions and held them violative of patients' due process
rights, hence unconstitutional. 36 The court's opinion acknowledges that
individually some of these provisions would meet the test of constitutional-
ity. The court correctly perceived that the aggregated provisions of
medical malpractice legislation may well raise constitutional questions
that individual provisions do not. The court reasoned that the act would
further held the provision was not so unreasonable that it would violate due process. 'I he court
asserted that
[t]he rule was intended by the legislature to give the jury the true extent of the damages
sustained by the plaintiff thereby. By scaling down the size ofjuryverdicts by the amount of
collateral benefits the plaintiff may have received, the legislature could reasonably assume
that a reduction in premiums would follow.
Id. at 585, 570 P.2d at 753. The opinion of the court did not directly address the serious equal
protection problem of differential treatment of medical malpractice victims.
132. Plaintiff received credit for any insurance premiums that he had paid.
133. 199 Neb. 97, 115-17, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977). In its decision the court discussed the
elective nature of the remedy. The court stated, however: "Even if the remedy were not elective, this
provision would be in the same category as the ceiling provided by the act and is justified by reason of
the public purpose sought to be served by the act." Id. at 116, 256 N.W.2d at 669. This statement
underscores the very favorable treatment that this "medical malpractice" legislation has initially
received in the courts.
134. 199 Neb. 97, 116-17, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669-70 (1977). This court reasoned that since
attorneys are court officers, subjecting their fees to court review is "not out of line with existing
practice." Id. at 117, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
135. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
136. Id. at 137.
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not have been enacted without the unconstitutional sections and therefore
found the entire act unconstitutional.1
37
In its opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court expressly discussed
the absence of a malpractice crisis inNorth Dakota, 38 a circumstance that
might have figured prominently in the decision. Courts elsewhere may
have been understandably reluctant to strike down legislation that was
passed in an attempt to deal with a genuinely critical social problem.
Nevertheless, as the malpractice crisis stabilizes'" or more effective
solutions than tort law modifications are found, courts in other states seem
likely to follow North Dakota's lead. Instead of being an aberrational
decision, Arneson v. Olson may augur a more critical judicial attitude
toward the constitutionality of tort law modifications.
V. PERSISTENT ISSUES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
It is highly doubtful that the public actually desires to have medical
malpractice victims go unrecompensed, despite its eagerness to alleviate
the medical malpractice crisis and maintain high quality health care. The
admittedly enormous costs of compensation must be balanced against the
unfairness of forcing victims of malpractice to shoulder all or part of their
grave financial burden.
In response to this dilemma, legislatures have taken affirmative steps
apart from statutory modification of tort law. Some states have taken an
active role in providing or supplementing malpractice insurance. Lousell
and Williams list five measures that legislatures have adopted: "1)
establishment ofjoint underwriting authorities, 2) authorization of mutual
insurance companies established by physicians and/or hospitals, 3)
control of malpractice insurance rates, 4) restrictions on notice of
cancellation, and 5) establishment of state controlled funds for payment of
awards in excess of certain amounts. 1 40 Although such legislation might
be criticized for favoring a special group, it largely eliminates the problem
of incomplete recovery and distributes the financial loss over society.
Another legislative approach that merits attention is adoption of
measures aimed at prevention of medical malpractice. Among these
measures are
1) the encouragement of better surveillance of the practice of medicine
(immunity from civil liability to those serving on "peer review" committees
and exemption from discovery of files of such committees), 2) the requirement
of continuing education as a condition of maintaining professional licenses,
137. Id.
138. Id. at 136.
139. Ingrassia, Medical Malpractice Shows Signs of Abating, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1977, at 1.
col. I.
140. 2 D. LOuISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 20.07, at 71. For discussion ofa proposed
bill to involve the federal government in insurance, see Nelson, Mushrooming Malpractice:A Federal
Rx, 11 TRIAL 19 (1975).
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3) the requirement of peer review, and 4) long range studies of the malpractice
problem, including the continuing collection of litigation and insurance
information.'
14
This approach is commendable because it attempts to remedy at least
some of the underlying problem. Critics have questioned its effectiveness,
arguing that because medical malpractice stems from fundamentally
competent physicians making occasional mistakes and not from the
general incompetence of physicians, measures aimed at increasing
competence will have no effect on the medical malpractice crisis.142
Empirical data are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of these preventive
measures.
CONCLUSION
After consideration of the various legislative responses to medical
malpractice problems, the only safe generalization is that no generaliza-
tion is possible. Rather, the wisdom, fairness, and effectiveness 143 of each
provision must be separately evaluated. Careful investigation of the
effectiveness of screening panels is especially needed.
Statutory modification of traditional doctrines in response to the
medical malpractice crisis has already complicated and diversified tort law.
If medical malpractice statutes are found to be effective and constitution-
al, other special interest groups may seek analogous treatment, 44 with the
141. 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 20.07, at 71-72.
142. Plant, supra note 52, at 15; Comment, supra note 3, at 686-87.
143. It is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the tort law modifications, in no small part
because legislatures have adopted several diverse measures simultaneously. Moreover, the public may
be becoming more aware of the causal connection between higher jury verdicts and higher insurance
costs, which ultimately results in higher health care costs. For a series ofadvcrtisemeflts by an insurer
stating dramatically these causal connections, see NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1978, at 26-27; NEWSWLLK,
Nov. 7, 1977, at 12-13; NEwsWEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 12-13.
The medical profession in turn has responded to malpractice suits with actions for malicious
prosecution. For a discussion of malicious prosecution suits as well as other causes of action (abuse of
process, intentional infliction of mental distress, prima facie tort, and defamation), see Birnbaum,
Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyiers for Instituting Unjust~tied Medical Malpractice
Actions, 45 FORD. L. REV. 1003 (1977); Note, Physician Counter-Suits: Malicious Prosecution,
Defamation andAbuse of Process As Remediesfor Meritless Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN, L. RLv. 604
(1976). These actions are not likely to be successful because most malpractice actions involve at least a
colorable claim for relief. Nevertheless, the availability of these actions to the physician might deter a
plaintiff from pursuing a meritless or weak claim. There has been at least one legislative response to
supplement these common-law actions. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 1977) makes
available to a physician an action against a claimant or a claimant's attorney who filed suit in "bad
faith." "Bad faith" is defined in the statute as filing and maintaining a claim "with reckless disregard as
to whether or not reasonable grounds exist for asserting the claim." Like the common-law actions,
this statutory provision should discourage invalid claims.
144. For a discussion of lobbying for legislative changes to meet the products liability "crisis,"
see Wade, supra note 87, at 10-li. Some of the changes recommended to meet the products liability
crisis bear a striking similarity to the legislative responses to the malpractice crisis. For example,
screening panels are proposed, as well as changing the statute of limitations to run from the time a
product was marketed and not from the time of injury.
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eventual result that basic tort principles will be greatly altered. Ifrecovery
ceilings, abrogation of the collateral sources rule, elimination of the ad
damnum clause, and other changes are legislatively desirable, it would
seem far better to avoid piecemeal action under pressure of crises and to
make the desired changes for all tort cases after careful deliberation. In
addition to tort law modifications, there are other legislative responses
that might offer greater promise of stemming the medical malpractice
crisis without unfairly limiting or eliminating the victims' recoveries.
Legislatures should consult, perhaps commission, empirical studies of the
various approaches to assist their search for effective solutions to the
pressing problems of medical malpractice.
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